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Abstract
To encourage worker productivity, companies routinely adopt policies requiring employees to delay gratification. For
example, offices might prohibit use of the internet for personal purposes during regular business hours. Recent work in
social psychology, however, suggests that using willpower to delay gratification can negatively impact performance. We
report data from an experiment where subjects in a Willpower Treatment are asked to resist the temptation to join others in
watching a humorous video for 10 minutes. In relation to a baseline treatment that does not require willpower, we show
that resisting this temptation detrimentally impacts economic productivity on a subsequent task.
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Introduction
The office place is filled with tempting distractions from one’s
work, including everything from socialization with colleagues to
napping. For example, in some workplaces a temptation is the
Internet. Indeed, a widely cited survey conducted in 2005 by
America Online and Salary.com ranked personal Internet use as
the number one way people waste time at work [1]. To encourage
worker productivity, some offices adopt policies prohibiting
Internet use during work hours, with some even monitoring
employees’ Internet activities. As a result, many employees delay
gratification and wait until the workday ends to use the Internet.
However, a well-established result from social psychology is that
using willpower to delay gratification, whether from the Internet
or any of many other temptations, can detrimentally impact
performance on subsequent tasks [2].
One reason that resisting temptations can have adverse impact
on subsequent performance is that using willpower consumes an
individual’s energy [3–4]. Once this energy is depleted, willpower
can become more difficult to exercise which, in turn, can have
detrimental impact on one’s ability to delay gratification [5–9].
These ideas have received increasing attention by not only
psychologists but also economists [10–12].
Our goal is to understand whether exposure to a prohibited
tempting item reduces work productivity on a subsequent task. To
the best of our knowledge, the relation between temptation and
labor productivity has been addressed only by Bucciol et al. [13] in
a field experiment with children. That paper reports data
indicating the productivity of children is reduced after they are
exposed to temptation.
The experiment
Our experiment was conducted in 3 sessions at the Laboratory
for Experimental Economics (LEE) of the University of Copenha-
gen. Our analysis is based on 60 subjects recruited using ORSEE
[14]. The experiment was programmed using the software z-tree
[15]. On average, subjects spent 75 minutes in the experiment and
earned 125 Danish crowns (DKK, about 22 USD). After the
experiment we administered a short questionnaire about subjects’
characteristics; Table 1 summarizes the information we know on
the sample.
The experiment consists of three phases. In Phase 1, subjects
perform three counting tasks; in Phase 2 they have the possibility
to watch a funny video; in Phase 3 they perform ten counting
tasks. Subjects in each session are randomly assigned in two
treatments: No Willpower Treatment (NWT) and Willpower
treatment (WT). The only difference between treatments occurs in
Phase 2. In NWT the video starts automatically whereas in WT
subjects just see a red button labeled ‘‘VIDEO’’ on their screen.
The temptation is made salient by ensuring all subjects could hear
the sounds of the video. Subjects are not monitored in that no
experimenter is visibly present during this phase. WT subjects are
aware that the video will start if they press the red button, but they
are asked not to do so. If they press the red button, a text message
in their screen warns that they should not have pressed the button.
This is meant to recognize that button pressure might be
accidental. The video appears if subjects press the button once
more, but in this case they are considered overwhelmed by
temptation and therefore excluded from the analysis. In the
experiment we experienced just one case of pressing the red button
twice.
In phases 1 and 3 we measure subjects’ productivity through the
counting tasks. In each task subjects watch a video where 8
individuals are passing each other one or more balls of different
colors. Subjects have to count the exact number of times a specific
ball moves from one player to another one. When the video is
over, subjects have to report their answer. The level of complexity
varies from task to task with the number of ball passes subjects are
asked to count. At the end of each counting task they receive a
feedback with the correct answer, their guess and the points
earned. Points are assigned according to the precision of the
answer. Subjects earn 100 points if they precisely report the
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correct answer, 65 points if the difference between their guess and
the correct answer is 1 (either from above or below), 50 if the
difference is 2 and 0 points if the difference is bigger than 2. At the
end of the experiments points are converted in Danish crowns
(DKK), with the conversion set at 10 points = 1 DKK. Note that
an advantage to using our counting task is that participants
produce answers and, in close analogy with any piece-rate
economic production task, their productivity is quality (accuracy)
weighted. Further details regarding the experiment, instructions
and screenshots are available in the online Text S1.
The counting task requires concentration that is depleted (or not
replenished) in the willpower treatment [16]. Figure 1 reports the
average mistake (measured as the absolute difference between the
correct answer and the answer reported in each task by each
subject) in the NWT and WT samples, in Phase 1 and in Phase 3.
The size of mistakes made in the four sub-samples is statistically
different according to a two-way ANOVA interaction test
comparing the two NWT and WT groups over the two phases
(F(1,776) = 4.14, p= 0.04). It is also clear that mistakes occur less
frequently in Phase 1 of the WT than NWT (mean mistakes are
1.40 and 2.013 in WT and NWT, respectively); the reverse is true
in Phase 3 (mean mistakes are 1.18 and 0.91 in WT and NWT,
respectively). It follows that imprecision (i.e., size of mistakes) on
the assigned task is greater in WT than NWT after exposure to
temptation. In the next section we aim to estimate the effect of
temptation on productivity, with and without controlling for
subjects’ characteristics.
Results
Table 2 shows the output of four regression equations where the
dependent variable is the mistake, measured as the absolute
difference between the correct answer and the answer reported in
each task by each subject. Positive estimates of the coefficients
mean that the subject is more likely to make larger mistakes. To
account for the possibility that participants in WT and NWT may
have different mean precision, we adopt a difference-in-difference
strategy. In the specification we therefore treat three dummy
Table 1. Mean Participant Characteristics by Treatment.
Whole Sample NWT WT Rank-sum test
N. observations 60613 = 780 25613 = 325 35613 = 455
Payoff (DKK) 7.444 7.639 7.304 1.261
Age 25.650 26.200 25.257 2.753***
Female 0.333 0.200 0.429 26.672***
Danish 0.567 0.600 0.543 1.587
Field: Science 0.350 0.320 0.371 21.484
Field: Humanities 0.167 0.200 0.143 2.110**
N. household members 3.133 3.440 2.914 7.093***
Personal budget (k DKK) 3.707 4.032 3.474 1.679*
Note: the last column reports the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic (also known as Mann-Whitney test), under the null hypothesis that the two
independent samples (NWT and WT) are from populations with the same distribution.
* = significant at 10%;
** = significant at 5%;
*** = significant at 1%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053713.t001
Figure 1. Mean Number of Mistakes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053713.g001
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Table 2. Partial Correlates of Productivity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method Panel Poisson Panel Poisson Panel GLS Panel GLS
WT 20.363* 23.555* 20.613 25.926*
(0.214) (1.953) (0.470) (3.258)
Phase 3 20.792*** 21.499*** 21.101*** 21.805***
(0.105) (0.149) (0.365) (0.444)
WT6Phase 3 0.621*** 1.076*** 0.881* 1.290**
(0.142) (0.193) (0.478) (0.582)
Difficulty 2.541*** 2.764***
(correct answer/video length) (0.344) (1.010)
Age 20.021 20.018
(0.041) (0.069)
Female 0.582* 1.016*
(0.315) (0.602)
Danish 20.663 20.316
(0.406) (0.621)
Field: Science 20.248 20.224
(0.302) (0.525)
Field: Humanities 20.800** 20.857
(0.339) (0.564)
N. household members 20.220 20.113
(0.167) (0.244)
Personal budget (k DKK) 0.070 0.090
(0.061) (0.096)
WT6Difficulty 21.586*** 21.608
(correct answer/video length) (0.442) (1.323)
WT6Age 0.133** 0.242**
(0.061) (0.105)
WT6Female 20.852** 21.065
(0.389) (0.716)
WT6Danish 20.043 20.690
(0.484) (0.765)
WT6Field: Science 0.142 0.392
(0.385) (0.670)
WT6Field: Humanities 1.186*** 1.873**
(0.460) (0.798)
WT6N. household members 0.0780 20.152
(0.203) (0.314)
WT6Personal budget (k DKK) 0.054 0.137
(0.090) (0.148)
Constant 0.700*** 0.937 2.013*** 1.472
(0.159) (1.492) (0.359) (2.348)
Number of observations 780 780 780 780
Number of individuals 60 60 60 60
Wald Chi2 test 60.140 158.620 9.670 51.110
P-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.022] [0.000]
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variables: one indicates the treatment, to capture any between-
treatment differences in ‘‘skill’’, one is the Phase (3 as opposed to
1), to capture any ‘‘learning’’, and one the interaction between the
group and the phase, to capture the ‘‘temptation effect’’ of primary
interest.
Column (1) reports the output of a panel Poisson model with
random effects and only these three variables in the specification.
We find a significant effect of all the variables:
– Skill effect: The group variable ‘‘WT’’ is negative, suggesting
that the WT sample is more skilled than the NWT sample (the
effect is significant at 10%).
– Learning effect: The phase variable ‘‘Phase 3’’ is negative,
suggesting that learning occurs (the effect is significant at 1%).
– Temptation effect: The interaction variable ‘‘WT6Phase 3’’ is
positive. This suggests that, on average, the WT sample is more
likely to make larger mistakes than the NWT sample, after
exposure to temptation in Phase 2 (the effect is significant at
1%).
As a robustness check we enrich the specification with further
control variables: one for the task complexity (video difficulty,
measured as the ratio between the correct answer and the video
length in seconds), as well as demographic variables for age, gender,
nationality, and variables for the field of studies (science or
humanities, as opposed to social sciences), number of household
members (apart from the subject), and personal budget. These
variables are added because they can potentially influence our
dependent variable (e.g., the mistake could be larger when the task is
more difficult.) All the control variables are also interacted with WT
to capture any between-treatment heterogeneity in participants’
characteristics. In particular, this enriched specification should
remove potential biases due to the different characteristics of the two
treatment groups (see Table 1). Although task complexity and some
characteristics of the subjects seem relevant predictors of the final
outcome, our above findings are still confirmed.
The models in Columns (1) and (2) also allow us to predict the
expected mistake size, as an exponential function of the
specification. Predictions from Column (1) coincide with the
descriptive statistics shown in Figure 1, while predictions from
Column (2) differ because they take into account the character-
istics of the two treatment groups. In this case we find that a
subject with average characteristics will make in Phase 1 a mistake
1.93 times larger than the overall average mistake. In contrast, the
same individual in Phase 3 would make just 0.43 times the average
mistake if not exposed to temptation, and 1.26 times the average
mistake if exposed to temptation. Thus, all else equal, mistakes
subsequent to temptation exposure are nearly three times as large
in the absence of temptation exposure.
Columns (3) and (4) report a panel GLS model with random
effects on the same regression equations as Columns (1) and (2).
The qualitative findings reported above are confirmed. Results in
Table 2 are preserved also when using models with fixed effects
rather than random effects.
Discussion
In this paper we find that subjects required to resist the
temptation of a humorous video made significantly larger mistakes
on a subsequent counting task. This result is consistent with the
standard resource depletion theoretical framework from social
psychology, as discussed in the introduction. In particular,
willpower depletion resulting from resisting the temptation to
watch the video may have made concentration on a subsequent
labor productivity task more difficult. Alternatively, watching the
video may have promoted resource replenishment, enabling
higher levels of concentration on the subsequent task. Both
interpretations are consistent with the resource depletion theoret-
ical framework, and thus we would expect those who were resisting
watching the video to have lower subsequent productivity than
those who did not need to resist this temptation [13].
Recent work [6–9] suggests the extent to which participants
believe that willpower is a depletable resource can influence their
own ego-depletion and task performance. In light of our findings,
it is possible that participants believed themselves to be using
willpower to avoid watching the humorous video, and also
believed that willpower was a depletable resource. It would be
valuable to know whether performance improvements could be
generated by simply manipulating beliefs. Exploring this in future
research could have important implications for policies at the
workplace and other related environments.
An important limitation of our study is that it assessed
productivity on a novel task that required substantial concentra-
tion and allowed little room for error. In some work environments
tasks are routine and may require little concentration or cognitive
effort, and margins for error may be large. Connections between
resource depletion and productivity in these sorts of environments
are an open question worthy of continued exploration.
The findings of the present paper nevertheless seem to have
practical implications for many work environments. An important
one is that employers should not prohibit the Internet and yet
leave it available. Instead, employers should either remove it
entirely or, when doing this is impractical, allow employees a
certain amount of time – maybe even as often as several minutes
per hour – for personal Internet activity. Perhaps lunch-breaks can
be somewhat shortened to accommodate ‘‘surf-time’’. Alterna-
tively, employers might consider allowing regular Internet breaks,
in the same way that many currently accommodate short but not
Table 2. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method Panel Poisson Panel Poisson Panel GLS Panel GLS
Hausman test 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.140
P-value [0.999] [0.999] [0.999] [0.998]
Dependent variable: absolute difference between correct and reported answer in each task. Estimation methods: (1) and (2): Panel Poisson regression with random
effects; (3) and (4): Panel GLS regression with random effects. Robust standard errors in round parentheses; p-values in squared parentheses.
* = significant at 10%;
** = significant at 5%;
*** = significant at 1%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0053713.t002
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infrequent cigarette or coffee breaks. More generally, our study
offers insights relevant for the design of efficient (productivity
enhancing) policies directed towards providing employees breaks
from regular work activity.
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